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Why the Bar Needs Academics—and
Vice Versa

FRED C. ZACHARIAS*

Members of the judiciary and practicing bar commonly bemoan the
theoretical approach of academics.1 They suggest that law professors
have no sense of reality and that academics write and teach in a way that
bears little relationship to the actual practice and regulation of lawyers.
They warn that unless academics reform, academics will render
themselves irrelevant.
In this brief essay, I relate one personal experience to illustrate my
suspicion that, in many cases, the bar has it precisely backwards. The
incidents that I describe are, by their nature, anecdotal. Yet I believe that
they are representative and highlight an important, and often overlooked,
point about the significance of the legal academic enterprise.
The events in question took place at a recent symposium sponsored by
the University of Arizona College of Law, entitled “The Future Structure
and Regulation of Law Practice.”2 The conference brought together
* Herzog Endowed Research Professor and University Professor, University of
San Diego School of Law. The author thanks Professor Shaun Martin for his helpful
comments on a draft of this Essay and Christopher Swanson for his research assistance.
1. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34–35 (1992) (arguing that
“schools are moving toward pure theory” and that many academics “have a low regard
for the practice of law”); J. Cunyon Gordon, A Response from the Visitor from Another
Planet, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1953, 1960 (1993) (noting the view that scholars “consider law
practice the province of the brain dead”); Randall T. Shepard, What the Profession
Expects of Law Schools, 34 IND. L. REV. 7, 11 (2000) (“[T]he profession expects more
from its scholars than it now receives. The concentration of American law journals and
American law journal writing on matters so arcane that professionals find little use for
them ought to be a matter of more candid discussion.” (footnote omitted)).
2. The conference was held from February 22–23, 2002 in Tucson, Arizona. See
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representatives of the bar and academia. The credentials of both the
academics and professional participants were of the highest order. Topics
ranged from discussions of recent developments in legal ethics and hard
law fields, to controversial proposals regarding changes in the regulation
of lawyers, to interdisciplinary analyses of the legal profession.
What struck me during this two day event was how frequently the
positions of the nonacademic participants relied on wistful idealizations
about the legal profession that caused the practitioners to ignore the
reality of practice. I would not presume to suggest that academics are
universally more practical than practitioners. Law professors, even those
who formerly practiced law, are separated from day-to-day lawyering.
They cannot hope to keep abreast of information that they would learn
from being present in the courtroom or law office. Nevertheless, academics
have access to a great deal of information about their specialties. And
unlike practitioners, academics have time to think about how well
prevailing practice implements the theories underlying a particular
field’s legal doctrines. My experience at the Arizona conference, more
than ever, left me with the surprising, counterintuitive sense that the bar
often needs law professors to bring its approaches back to earth.
Let me set out just a few examples from the conference. One panel
reviewed developments, inter alia, in securities regulation.3 A noted
securities regulation scholar4 discussed the way judges had implemented
new federal legislation that had changed the standards for selecting class
plaintiffs.5 The panelist suggested that judicial implementation of the
law may have undermined the legislative goal of identifying lawyers and
clients in class action litigation who would implement the adversary
system’s model of client-centered representation.

generally University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law, Schedule of Events,
http://w3.arizona.edu/%7Euaextend/law/schedule.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2003)
(providing information about the conference and its participants).
3. The panel was entitled “The Evolution of Specialized Regulatory Systems.” Id.
4. The panelist was Professor Elliott Weiss, Charles E. Ares Professor of Law at
the University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. See University of Arizona,
James E. Rogers College of Law, Faculty Profile, at http://www.law.arizona.edu/
ualaw/academicprogram/profile.cfm?facultyid=24 (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000) (requiring courts in securities class actions to
“appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported plaintiff class
that the court determines to be most capable of adequately representing the interests
of class members” and providing criteria bearing on that assessment); see, e.g.,
Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 545–46 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that
lead plaintiffs “presumptively” should be those with the “largest financial interest in
the relief sought by the class”); Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845,
854 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff who had suffered the greatest loss
was entitled to be lead plaintiff).
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At this point, a questioner from the floor raised an academic question:
In light of the difficulty of identifying class plaintiffs with enough stake
in the matter to care about the litigation, and in light of the history of
class counsel acting in their own interests rather than those of clients,
how did the panel view recent academic proposals to rethink the nature
of class litigation? Among the more modest proposals are efforts by
courts in the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits to auction the position of
lead counsel to the highest bidder.6 More radically, what about
proposals to take a realistic approach to the nature of class counsel—one
that would recognize that class counsel have the actual stake in the
matter?7 The most prominent proposal in this regard is that of John
Macey and Geoffrey Miller, which suggests that class counsel be
allowed to purchase the interests of the class (with the proceeds of that
transaction being distributed to class members) and then to litigate the
matter on their own behalf.8
6. E.g., In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 150–51 (D.N.J. 1998); In re Oracle Sec. Litig.,
131 F.R.D. 688, 690–91 (N.D. Cal. 1990); see also Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction
Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 652
(2002) (evaluating the selection of class counsel by auction). The purpose of the auction
procedure is to reduce fees that traditionally have been charged to the class and approved
by supervising courts. To the extent that potential class counsel must compete for the right
to represent a class, in theory, the ultimate fee recovery should decrease. But see id. at
667–69 (questioning whether the auction process effectively reduces fees).
7. See, e.g., Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class
Representatives in Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165, 188 (1990) (suggesting the
elimination of class representatives and increasing the decisionmaking responsibility of
class counsel, subject to the supervision of class “monitors”); Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation,
Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 53, 64 (discussing nontraditional
options for selecting and paying for class counsel); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform,
Qui Tam, and the Role of Plaintiff, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 167, 169
(discussing methods of addressing the real incentives of participants in class actions); Paula
Batt Wilson, Attorney Investment in Class Action Litigation: The Agent Orange Example,
45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291, 294 (1994) (discussing the option of allowing speculative
investments in class actions by attorneys).
8. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Market Approach to Tort
Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 909, 914 (1995) (suggesting making class
counsel the effective clients by auctioning the class claims to them); Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4
(1991) (discussing alternative approaches to the attorney’s role in class actions). The
Macey-Miller proposal is appealing in the sense that it takes a pragmatic view of the role
of class counsel in many class actions. However, it is radical because allowing lawyers
to compete for the purchase of the interests of the class members assumes that multiple
lawyers will be able to fund such an enterprise. Inevitably, this will open the door to
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The response of the academic on the panel was reasoned and
pragmatic. He suggested that the radical Macey-Miller proposal is not
necessary in most securities class litigation because, typically, there are
some potential class plaintiffs with enough stake in the matter that they
will be willing and able to serve in the common role of the client.9 Even
with respect to class litigation in which the class members’ stake is
small, the academic was dubious of the Macey-Miller approach because
of practical impediments to its implementation.10 Still, the academic
allowed, the approach has some appeal. It permits regulation of the
lawyer to proceed on the basis of genuine interests, rather than on the
basis of fictional assumptions that class counsel act solely in their
clients’ interests, that class plaintiffs actually make the litigation
decisions, and that class plaintiffs exercise control over counsel in the
interests of other class members.
The moderator of the panel, a respected practitioner,11 was horrified.
Her facetious comment before cutting off debate was that “this would
solve all of the problems being addressed at this conference. Just eliminate
the client and then there won’t be any issues anymore.”
Why did the moderator respond in this way? The Macey-Miller proposal
did propose something radical, but for good reason; namely, that class
counsel often are the real parties in interest in class litigation. Yet the
notion that counsel sometimes should assume control and that clients
should surrender it is anathema to the conventional model of clientcentered advocacy. The moderator, seeped in customary practice, could
not even accept the possibility of a new paradigm. She could not bring
herself to analyze, as the academic on the panel did, whether the MaceyMiller approach made practical sense, might protect clients better than
the conventional model, or might enable courts and legislatures to
regulate class action litigation more effectively. In short, the practitioner
was blinded by the tradition in which she had been raised and in which
allowing lawyers to finance their bids, either through traditional financing options or by
selling shares in the litigation. See id. at 112–13. Moreover, once a lawyer does succeed
in the bidding, the theory then allows the lawyer to become the decisionmaker in the
case, as if he were acting pro se in the litigation. In contrast, the real clients in interest
have only two choices: participate in accepting a discounted and risk-adjusted value of
the recovery in advance or opt out.
9. For example, major shareholders such as mutual or pension funds often have
suffered sufficient losses in securities fraud that, had they acted as class representatives,
would have given them big enough financial stakes to supervise the class attorneys.
10. Professor Weiss referred to such practical impediments as (1) insuring enough
bidders for the claims and (2) the questionable ability of judges to supervise the advance
valuations upon which payments to the class would be predicated.
11. To avoid embarrassing panelists, I avoid naming some of them. For purposes of
this article, it is enough to note that the moderator in question is a well-respected lawyer
for a Phoenix, Arizona law firm and has been heavily involved in state bar activities.

704

ZACHARIAS.DOC

[VOL. 40: 701, 2003]

1/14/2020 4:28 PM

Why the Bar Needs Academics
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

she had prospered. She had closed her mind to potentially useful new ideas.
A slightly different phenomenon occurred with respect to the
presentation of Larry Fox, a well-respected Philadelphia practitioner
who has been heavily involved in law reform activities and whom I
consider a friend. Mr. Fox made a luncheon speech12 that emphasized
positions he had previously taken on the proposals of the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (MDP).13 Fox opposed those
proposals, as have I on related but significantly different grounds.14
Fox relied on the notion of “core values” of the legal profession,
arguing that allowing lawyers to join with other service providers to
offer “one-stop shopping” for clients would undermine confidentiality,
loyalty, professional independence, and other key aspects of lawyerclient relationships.15 At the Arizona conference, Fox offered a vigorous,
eloquent analysis of Enron-related events to illustrate why, in his mind,
any change in the historical approach to lawyering (and the core values
to which lawyers must adhere) could only prove disastrous.16
As Ted Schneyer17 and other academics18 have pointed out, however,
12. Lawrence J. Fox, MDPs Done Gone: The Silver Lining in the Very Black
Enron Cloud, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 547 (2002).
13. E.g., Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional World: They
Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1097 (2000); Lawrence J. Fox, Free Enterprise Heaven; Ethics Hell, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1217 (2000); Lawrence J. Fox, MDP or Not? MDPs and Legal
Ethics: Big 5 Lays Siege upon Rule 5.4, 60 OR. ST. B. BULL., July 2000, at 15; Lawrence J.
Fox, Old Wine in Old Bottles: Preserving Professional Independence, 72 TEMP. L. REV.
971 (1999); Lawrence J. Fox, The Argument Against Change, 48 R.I. B.J., Apr. 2002, at 17.
14. My position on multidisciplinary practice regulation is that it makes little
sense to regulate all lawyers and all types of potential multidisciplinary practice
identically, as both the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice and Lawrence
Fox have insisted. Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law
Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation,
44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 843 (2002).
15. Fox, supra note 12, at 549–55.
16. Id. at 555.
17. Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Regulation, and the AntiInterference Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1469, 1470–71 (2000) (analyzing
and challenging the argument that multidisciplinary practice undermines core values).
18. E.g., Nathan M. Crystal, Core Values: False and True, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
747, 753 (2001) (criticizing the emphasis that Fox and others place on the concept of
core values); John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and
the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal
Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 137–39 (2000)
(challenging the core values argument); cf. Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs:
Context, History, and Process, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1626–27 (2000) (questioning the
premises of the proponents of the core values position); Bradley G. Johnson, Note,

705

ZACHARIAS.DOC

1/14/2020 4:28 PM

Fox’s position appeals to custom in perhaps a too broad and unrealistic
way. The same core values Fox relies upon in the multidisciplinary
practice context also justify scorched earth litigation and other aspects of
lawyering that are the profession’s crosses to bear.19 Moreover, when
pressed to consider the ways MDP organizations can help some clients,20
Fox declines to acknowledge the benefits because he sees them as potential
breaches in the dam that ultimately would undermine his core values.21
This overemphasis on the orthodox approach to lawyer regulation is
interesting because Fox uses it to oppose multidisciplinary practice. Yet
it is the same fierce reliance on tradition that may have led Sherwin
Simmons, the Chair of the MDP Commission and another leading
practitioner, to produce a proposal that failed to garner support in the
ABA House of Delegates.22 Early in the commission’s study of the
matter, Mr. Simmons was asked whether the commission might consider
treating different lawyers and contexts of lawyering differently for
purposes of multidisciplinary practice.23 He responded that the only
Ready or Not, Here They Come: Why the ABA Should Amend the Model Rules to
Accommodate Multidisciplinary Practices, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 951, 1000 (2000)
(arguing for changes in the MDP proposals to accommodate core values).
19. In other words, while values like confidentiality and loyalty to the client are
important, they also can be overemphasized to produce overly aggressive lawyering
tactics that many commentators, and certainly the public, consider to be wrongful.
20. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 18, at 1652 (“[A]n increase in MDP
opportunities would provide more widespread and innovative legal services, as well as
more client choice in shopping for legal services.”).
21. Thus, for example, Fox’s Arizona presentation derides one-stop shopping as an
evil that, in and of itself, produced the Enron disaster. See Fox, supra note 12, at 555
(“Does anyone doubt that this loss of self-regulation would have been avoided if the Big
Five had stuck to its collective knitting and avoided the grand world of one-stop
shopping?”). Yet Fox’s conclusions may be overkill. Despite Enron, it is clear that onestop shopping—the ability to obtain legal and other services from a single-service
provider—can produce efficiencies for clients. The better focus would be on whether it
is possible to facilitate these efficiencies without promoting the twofold danger that
standard client protections in legal representation will be undermined and that services
that lawyers provide to society when representing clients will be eliminated by lawyers
who associate with nonlawyers.
22. Comm’n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Am. Bar Ass’n, Recommendation,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecom10f.html (2000); Comm’n on Multidisciplinary
Practice, Am. Bar Ass’n, Report to the House of Delegates, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mdpfinalrep2000.html (2000); Comm’n on Multidisciplinary Practice, Am. Bar Ass’n, Report
to the House of Delegates, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html (Aug. 1999).
23. This interaction occurred at a joint meeting of the Association of Professional
Responsibility Lawyers, the National Organization of Bar Counsel, and the American
Bar Association Committee on Professional Responsibility in Los Angeles, California on
February 5, 1999. Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers, ABA Midyear
Meeting (Feb. 4–6, 1999); cf. Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the “No”
Rule Become a New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 893 (1999) (noting that a key
threshold issue for the MDP Commission was “whether to adopt the same rules for a Big
Five-affiliated MDP as for a very small MDP. In other words, should there be the same
rules for Main Street lawyers as for Wall Street lawyers?”).
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nonnegotiable premise the commission would rely upon in its
deliberations—the only precondition—was the customary view that all
lawyers should be regulated identically.
Notice what this reliance on the customary view, and Fox’s reliance
on core values, means. The catalyst for change in multidisciplinary practice
regulation came from large law firms that wished to compete with global
accounting firms for the business of multinational corporate clients.24
These clients, represented by in-house counsel in their dealings with outside
lawyers, can protect their own interests in their retainer agreements. They
are capable of making sophisticated judgments about when and
whether to waive the full force of core value regulation. Thus, to the extent
these clients wish to waive some conflict of interest, confidentiality, or
other core value protections because they receive compensating benefits
from multidisciplinary representation, their decisions probably should be
honored. In contrast, when less sophisticated individual clients are offered
one-stop shopping by associations of lawyers and other service providers,25
they may need the safeguards that the so-called core values provide.
The reliance of both the Chair of the commission and Larry Fox on the
entrenched traditions of lawyer regulation interfered with the pursuit of
pragmatic, nuanced distinctions in regulation. By foreclosing the possibility
of different rules for different settings, the commission gave added force
to Fox’s arguments on the ABA floor because individual clients often do
need the protections that Fox advocates. By treating those values as
talismans, however, Fox avoided the reality that multidisciplinary
24. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 18, at 88 (discussing the fear that failure to
allow multidisciplinary practice will lead to a transfer of legal work abroad); James C.
Moore, Lawyers and Accountants: Is the Delivery of Legal Services Through the
Multidisciplinary Practice in the Best Interests of the Clients and the Public?, 20 PACE L.
REV. 33, 36 (1999) (arguing that multidisciplinary practice provides greater efficiency,
lowers client expenses, and enhances the quality of service); Gary A. Munneke, A
Nightmare on Main Street (Part MXL): Freddie Joins an Accounting Firm, 20 PACE L.
REV. 1, 6 (1999) (discussing the legal profession’s “nightmare” when confronted by
competition from international accounting firms); Robert L. Ostertag, Our Profession Is
Not for Sale, 18 GP SOLO, Jan.–Feb. 2001, at 22, 27 (criticizing the ABA for failing to
defend the bar against competition from the accounting profession); see also Terry,
supra note 23, at 877 (recounting the history of the multidisciplinary practice debate).
25. Consider, for example, situations in which realtors merge with real estate
lawyers, insurers merge with insurance defense lawyers, and personal agents merge with
contracts lawyers. In these situations, there is a real risk that the lawyers will
subordinate the interests of their clients to the entrepreneurial interests of the lawyers’
partners. The individual clients, particularly if they are unsophisticated, may not fully
understand the risks inherent in the representation or be able to protect themselves
through special advance contractual arrangements with the lawyers.
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practice might benefit some clients and lawyers. He also underestimated
the possibility that honoring the core values too much may give rise to
negative consequences in other settings.26
In other words, even practitioners who are heavily involved in
regulatory reform, like Simmons and Fox, can become too seeped in the
profession to which they have become accustomed. Simmons and Fox
are committed traditionalists. While I would never say that they act
unthinkingly, their respect for the time-honored approaches to legal
regulation in this instance prevented them from even contemplating
potentially appropriate change.
In my experience, that has not been an unusual phenomenon,
especially among practitioners who have found economic success under
a particular regime. When modern developments suggest that traditional
regulation falls short in dealing with complexities of modern practice,
leading practitioners often resist alternatives. In contrast, academics—who
typically have opted out of practice and have less stake in the
traditions—view proposing fresh approaches to be part of their mission.
Because academics subject their ideas to a process of criticism and
analysis as a routine, they tend to be less rigid in their approaches.
Re-evaluating unsuccessful regulation simply is one of the roles that
academics play.
Perhaps the best example of the interplay between academics and the
bar arose with respect to my own presentation at the Arizona conference.
I intentionally embraced a provocative subject, which I entitled
“Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics
Regulation.”27 I surveyed a series of overgeneralizations and false
assumptions that underlie the professional codes and the institutional
systems of professional regulation. My goal was not to argue that
reliance on overgeneralizations and bright line standards always is
wrong, but rather to call attention to counterfactual premises of
regulation that regulators now seem to take for granted. The exercise
was not particularly theoretical, in the pejorative sense that practitioners
employ that characterization, but instead was an effort to encourage a
hardheaded, genuine assessment of legal practice and its regulation.
Two judges on the panel clearly were offended by my analysis. To
my surprise, however, their annoyance was not with my normative
prescriptions, but with my factual contentions that modern regulation
relies on fictions such as “all lawyers are [roughly] the same” and
26. It may, for example, prevent sophisticated corporate clients from obtaining the
one-stop shopping that could cut down on fees and avoid duplication of services by
different categories of service providers.
27. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 829 (article presented).
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“lawyers are more upstanding than other citizens and less prone to human
weaknesses.” The judges’ heated responses were that lawyers are unique as
a group because they are “professionals” and “officers of the court.” Based
on these old saws, the two panelists saw no need to reconsider anything.
Later in the discussion, however, these same judges addressed a
different topic with the laments that the profession “is going to hell,”
that lawyers routinely fail to act as officers of the court when doing so is
inconvenient, and that modern lawyers increasingly serve parochial selfinterests. The judges hardly noted the inconsistencies in their reactions
when they were called on them. They could not see that the root of their
laments may be the practice of regulating the bar as if wistful
idealizations of lawyers as professionals and officers of the court are
self-executing. My so-called academic analysis of existing regulation and
my call for reconsideration stemmed precisely from a desire to address
the failings of modern regulation realistically. The panelists’ approach
was to ignore the reality based on well-worn, but counterfactual,
assumptions about the profession.
In all three of the above examples, the problem was that the practitioners
and judges were blinded by their own traditions. They had lost sight of real
problems of actual practice that might need new theoretical approaches
if they are to be corrected. In each instance, it was the academics who
were looking for workable solutions and the practitioners who refused to
consider them because they were tied to old approaches.
The reader should not misunderstand my position. There often is little
practical benefit in the work of academics who make it a point of honor
to separate their analyses from what happens in the real world. Some
members of the guild actually take this approach. Yet in my experience,
that kind of academia is not the norm. There certainly is a danger in
referring to academia as a monolithic organization of pure scholars who
hide themselves in an ivory tower.
Nor should one overgeneralize when referring to practitioners. Among
practitioners, there are those who think in theoretical terms and those who
simply do their jobs. Moreover, the group of thinking professionals consists
partly of practitioners who, in a sense, are semiacademics—persons (like
some of those whom I have criticized here) who actually engage in law
reform activities and enjoy attending academic conferences like the one in
Arizona. Within either group may be elite practitioners whose success
stems from the old way of doing things and others who may be more
receptive to novel approaches.
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In reality, though, it is more common for practitioners to question the
contributions of all academics than it is for academics to divorce
themselves from insights that can be gleaned from everyday practice.
Most law professors understand that they have much to learn from
practitioners. Some even use their sabbaticals to refresh their experiences.
Indeed, at the Arizona conference, I profited a great deal from the
positions that the practitioners took. One panelist, a bankruptcy practitioner,28
carefully outlined a whole series of ethics issues arising in the
bankruptcy context that I never would have considered without her
insights. Simon Lorne, a practitioner and former SEC general counsel,
educated me about changes in approaches to securities regulation of
which only a practitioner would have been aware.29 Even the impassioned
pleas of Larry Fox contained important elements that have helped form
my thoughts on the specific topic he addresses.30
Academics would never deny that we have at least as much to learn
from practitioners as they have to learn from us. But the process is not
one-sided. Contrary to the pejorative claims regarding modern legal
scholarship, academics have something important to contribute. The term
“theoretical” is not equivalent to the terms “unrealistic,” “quixotic,” or
“unworkable.” It is time practitioners and academics alike set aside the
rhetoric, once and for all, and join each other at the table with open minds.

28. The attorney practitioner was Susan Freeman, who offered a presentation
entitled “Specialized Ethics Rules for Bankruptcy Lawyers.” See University of Arizona,
James E. Rogers College of Law, supra note 2 (providing information about the
conference and its participants).
29. Simon Lorne’s lecture was entitled “Regulatory Agency Reliance on
Professionals in a Changing Professional Environment.” See id.
30. As I have noted, my position is that emphasizing Fox’s core values is more
important when trying to safeguard the interests of unsophisticated individual clients
than when sophisticated clients are in question. The unsophisticated clients are not as
capable of understanding or preserving their own interests in loyalty and confidentiality,
nor are they as capable of assessing when waiving the full force of such protections is
economically sensible. See discussion supra note 25.
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